Narrator's post:
Both Germany and Japan were able to mobilize the majority of their populations to support their war efforts in Europe and Asia respectively, with only a minority against any launching of aggression. In Germany’s case, Hitler had gradually garnered support from many Germans through justifying German rearmament and later invasion of Europe and France in particular, as attempts to restore Germany and its army to its former glories of Empire in Europe, and importantly, correct the perceived wrongs the Treaty of Versailles, signed in 1919 at the conclusion of World War One, had inflicted upon Germany. The downsizing of Germany’s army had been a particular point of conflict for many ordinary Germans which Hitler capitalize upon, as they had upheld the army as a source of national pride. In Japan’s case, invasion of China and later Asia was meshed within a variety of national reasons, ranging from what many Japanese nationalists believed was long overdue in terms of the elevation of Japan from a secondary to first- rate power of equal status against the West, to making her self- sufficient and not being dependent upon other powers for her economic needs. Invasion of China and Southeast Asia was thus deemed the best way to achieved these goals, a view Tojo hastened upon his appointment as Premier of Japan. Though the Allied powers had achieved some level of justification; such as avenging Pearl Harbor in the US’s case and protecting the British Isles in the case of the UK, more would have to be done to justify to the populations of each power why it was necessary to fight the Axis powers. By the start of 1942, the Allies had much to do still in this and the earlier areas discussed to turn the war around.
Thursday, November 10, 2011
Technological gaps
Narrator's post:
Likewise, by the start of 1942, Japan and Germany had seemingly the advantage in far superior technology than either the US, UK or USSR. Japan’s campaign in Southeast Asia had been decisively influenced by the Zero fighter. In the hands of skilled pilots mostly blooded in the China campaign, it was certainly more than a match for any counterpart the Allies could deploy. As Tom Wade pointed out in his blog entry, Japan had command of the sky as she invaded Singapore, and this command owed much to the contributions of the Zero fighter in these early stages of the war. Japan put her possession of a modern naval fleet to good use, crippling the US naval presence in Pearl Harbor with the destruction of many capital ships such as the battleship Arizona, and destroying all Allied naval opposition, notably the Prince of Wales and the Repulse off the Malayan coast, and so monopolizing command of the seas of Southeast Asia. In Germany, in terms of tank models the Wehrmacht and the Allies had seemingly compatible models; the Char B-1 heavy tank of France and the Matilda tanks of the British able to compete against the Panzers. The real advantage Nazi Germany possessed was that the Luffwaffe was able to effectively support the Panzer divisions in attacks, first against Poland and then invading France. Planes such as the Junkers were able to quickly dive-bomb opposition to facilitate the advance of the Panzers, while the ME fighters provided close protection. The Allies could never hope to stand against the effective application and combination of these tactics, honed for years in earlier conflicts such as the Spanish Civil War.
Likewise, by the start of 1942, Japan and Germany had seemingly the advantage in far superior technology than either the US, UK or USSR. Japan’s campaign in Southeast Asia had been decisively influenced by the Zero fighter. In the hands of skilled pilots mostly blooded in the China campaign, it was certainly more than a match for any counterpart the Allies could deploy. As Tom Wade pointed out in his blog entry, Japan had command of the sky as she invaded Singapore, and this command owed much to the contributions of the Zero fighter in these early stages of the war. Japan put her possession of a modern naval fleet to good use, crippling the US naval presence in Pearl Harbor with the destruction of many capital ships such as the battleship Arizona, and destroying all Allied naval opposition, notably the Prince of Wales and the Repulse off the Malayan coast, and so monopolizing command of the seas of Southeast Asia. In Germany, in terms of tank models the Wehrmacht and the Allies had seemingly compatible models; the Char B-1 heavy tank of France and the Matilda tanks of the British able to compete against the Panzers. The real advantage Nazi Germany possessed was that the Luffwaffe was able to effectively support the Panzer divisions in attacks, first against Poland and then invading France. Planes such as the Junkers were able to quickly dive-bomb opposition to facilitate the advance of the Panzers, while the ME fighters provided close protection. The Allies could never hope to stand against the effective application and combination of these tactics, honed for years in earlier conflicts such as the Spanish Civil War.
Political Differences
Narrator's post:
Even until 1942, the US, UK and USSR were divided politically despite the threats they faced on their borders. Stalin was constantly suspicious of US and UK intentions to launch a Second Front, believing that they were delaying any possible launch in order to let Nazi Germany weaken the USSR with its invasion Operation Barbarossa, in spite of the fact that the USA was sending her “Lend- Lease” supplies since late 1941. As a result of such attempts the USA was suffering severe losses in the Atlantic as a result of the U-Boat menace by 1942. Officials on the Soviet side did little to provide any assistance required by the US and UK, while public opinion in the US was also slow in coming to terms about providing aid to the USSR, as only till February 1942 would 84% of Americans back the provision of aid to the Soviets. Likewise, though they had closer relations than with the USSR, the UK and the US were still in the process of working out their war aims and a common strategy to defeat the Axis powers, while also having to reach out to the USSR. Unanswered questions at the start of 1942 remained, such as how a combined command structure could be formed? who were suitable candidates to be appointed to various positions? Who could liaise and coordinate between the different sides? Furthermore, from top to bottom, officials of all sides tasked to work together had a certain level of distain and dissatisfaction, and at the top Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill in particular were defensive of their own national interests right at the start, and only over time would such issues be smoothened out.
Even until 1942, the US, UK and USSR were divided politically despite the threats they faced on their borders. Stalin was constantly suspicious of US and UK intentions to launch a Second Front, believing that they were delaying any possible launch in order to let Nazi Germany weaken the USSR with its invasion Operation Barbarossa, in spite of the fact that the USA was sending her “Lend- Lease” supplies since late 1941. As a result of such attempts the USA was suffering severe losses in the Atlantic as a result of the U-Boat menace by 1942. Officials on the Soviet side did little to provide any assistance required by the US and UK, while public opinion in the US was also slow in coming to terms about providing aid to the USSR, as only till February 1942 would 84% of Americans back the provision of aid to the Soviets. Likewise, though they had closer relations than with the USSR, the UK and the US were still in the process of working out their war aims and a common strategy to defeat the Axis powers, while also having to reach out to the USSR. Unanswered questions at the start of 1942 remained, such as how a combined command structure could be formed? who were suitable candidates to be appointed to various positions? Who could liaise and coordinate between the different sides? Furthermore, from top to bottom, officials of all sides tasked to work together had a certain level of distain and dissatisfaction, and at the top Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill in particular were defensive of their own national interests right at the start, and only over time would such issues be smoothened out.
Gulfs in Industrial Production
Narrator's post:
Furthermore, what made an Allied victory even more unlikely at the start of 1942 were the series of political, industrial, technological and moral advantages the Axis powers acquired thus far. Industrially, through expanded economic platforms brought about by acquisition of resource rich territories in Europe and Asia, the economies of both Germany and Japan had a “head start” in producing war materiel. While US military expenditure in 1940 for instance amounted to only 2% of its GDP, in contrast, by 1939 Nazi Germany devoted a quarter of its GDP to producing war material, and as resources became increasingly available following its conquests, such expenditure increased to include two- thirds of her labour force and an increasing amount of foreign workers and POWs were set to work for the economy. In particular, the invasion of the USSR and early successes gave Nazi Germany access to amongst others, the Ukraine and its grain producing areas, three- quarters of iron, ore, coal and steel, the populations of the occupied territories and at least one- fifth of the USSR’s rail network; all vital commodities for war production. Meanwhile, Japanese campaigns in Asia gave her access to Southeast Asia’s economic resources such as the tin of Malaya, along with sources of manpower from former colonial possessions. In doing so she deprived the UK in particular of the supplies she depended upon for her economy; an economy weakened further by the U- Boat threat. The economies of both Germany and Japan had been conditioned earlier by the influences of factors; in Germany’s case Hitler’s aims to rearm Germany meant an increase in the sizes of the different branches of the German Armed Forces, and in particular the Wehrmacht; in Japan’s case this was due to her campaigns in China. Hence a need arose for rapid rearmament in both Axis countries to support war aims. These differences in the scale of production was a major reason why both had been able to take over much of Europe and Southeast Asia, dominating all opposition in the process.
Furthermore, what made an Allied victory even more unlikely at the start of 1942 were the series of political, industrial, technological and moral advantages the Axis powers acquired thus far. Industrially, through expanded economic platforms brought about by acquisition of resource rich territories in Europe and Asia, the economies of both Germany and Japan had a “head start” in producing war materiel. While US military expenditure in 1940 for instance amounted to only 2% of its GDP, in contrast, by 1939 Nazi Germany devoted a quarter of its GDP to producing war material, and as resources became increasingly available following its conquests, such expenditure increased to include two- thirds of her labour force and an increasing amount of foreign workers and POWs were set to work for the economy. In particular, the invasion of the USSR and early successes gave Nazi Germany access to amongst others, the Ukraine and its grain producing areas, three- quarters of iron, ore, coal and steel, the populations of the occupied territories and at least one- fifth of the USSR’s rail network; all vital commodities for war production. Meanwhile, Japanese campaigns in Asia gave her access to Southeast Asia’s economic resources such as the tin of Malaya, along with sources of manpower from former colonial possessions. In doing so she deprived the UK in particular of the supplies she depended upon for her economy; an economy weakened further by the U- Boat threat. The economies of both Germany and Japan had been conditioned earlier by the influences of factors; in Germany’s case Hitler’s aims to rearm Germany meant an increase in the sizes of the different branches of the German Armed Forces, and in particular the Wehrmacht; in Japan’s case this was due to her campaigns in China. Hence a need arose for rapid rearmament in both Axis countries to support war aims. These differences in the scale of production was a major reason why both had been able to take over much of Europe and Southeast Asia, dominating all opposition in the process.
Military difficulties
Narrator:
Within the context of the overall question, early 1942 reflected a picture of overall domination in every theatre by the Axis powers. Militarily wise, by early 1942, Nazi Germany posed a formidable obstacle in Europe. Despite failing to defeat the RAF in the Battle of Britain, Nazi Germany succeeded in depriving Britain of her closest European ally France, and her armies totaling 145 divisions were now on the move in Russia, her U-Boats, at a peak strength of 300 vessels in August 1942 and accounting for 1.5 million tons of shipping alone in 1941, were still an existing threat to Allied convoys of vital war materials to Britain and the USSR, and seemingly together with Italy, Nazi Germany was controlling much of Central Europe. In the Pacific, following her surprise attack which crippled the US fleet in Pearl Harbor, Japan had rapidly taken Southeast Asia in a matter of months with only 11 divisions against at least on paper, strong Allied opposition, as reflected in the blog entries of Giles and Wade. With her formidable naval strength comprising an array of battleships such as the Yamato, 10 aircraft carriers like the Akagi, 39 cruisers, 100 destroyers, 63 submarines supported by 3000 planes, Japan was now readying to strengthen her presence and protect her captured territories beginning first with the capture of US- held Midway which Japan believed would break lingering US power and presence in the Pacific, forcing her to sue for peace.
Within the context of the overall question, early 1942 reflected a picture of overall domination in every theatre by the Axis powers. Militarily wise, by early 1942, Nazi Germany posed a formidable obstacle in Europe. Despite failing to defeat the RAF in the Battle of Britain, Nazi Germany succeeded in depriving Britain of her closest European ally France, and her armies totaling 145 divisions were now on the move in Russia, her U-Boats, at a peak strength of 300 vessels in August 1942 and accounting for 1.5 million tons of shipping alone in 1941, were still an existing threat to Allied convoys of vital war materials to Britain and the USSR, and seemingly together with Italy, Nazi Germany was controlling much of Central Europe. In the Pacific, following her surprise attack which crippled the US fleet in Pearl Harbor, Japan had rapidly taken Southeast Asia in a matter of months with only 11 divisions against at least on paper, strong Allied opposition, as reflected in the blog entries of Giles and Wade. With her formidable naval strength comprising an array of battleships such as the Yamato, 10 aircraft carriers like the Akagi, 39 cruisers, 100 destroyers, 63 submarines supported by 3000 planes, Japan was now readying to strengthen her presence and protect her captured territories beginning first with the capture of US- held Midway which Japan believed would break lingering US power and presence in the Pacific, forcing her to sue for peace.
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